Lonely Pilot Bob

In the summer of ’85, as I continued to ‘fine tune’ the ride, I made several discoveries – perhaps things I already knew, but didn’t know I knew them.  Or, more accurately, I didn’t know the full consequences or impact of what I knew.

My first revelation was that the Navy and Air Force had a fundamental philosophical difference in the way the Final Turn is flown.  The Navy used more of a “power on” approach; e.g., they consider the throttles primarily for controlling the descent rate and/or sink rate more than the airspeed.  I think with this philosophy Navy aviators tend to have a greater appreciation of the relationship between the throttles and descent rates than Air Force pilots do.  Of note, at the time of my work in 1985, the Navy had not experienced any T-38 stall/sink rate-related accidents.

My second discovery was that (perhaps) we were placing too much emphasis on the AOA (angle of attack) indicator in our stall recognition training.  ATC treated the AOA indicator as the ‘panacea’ to stall recognition, and it just isn’t always the case.

In the ’38 we had 2 AOA indicators: a light system on the dash, and a gauge in the cockpit.  The light system consisted of 3 lights: a red, or slow, ‘down’ arrow; a yellow, or fast “up” arrow; and a green on speed “donut” in the center of the indicator.  The arrows directed the pilot which way to put the nose of the aircraft when illuminated.

The gauge in the cockpit reflected the percentage of maximum lift, expressed in AOA.  The problem with this system is, pilots became too dependent upon this “idiot light,” in combination with the gauge indication, to recognize stalls or sink rates.  On the proposed stall/sink-rate ride, I could put a jet in a very high sink rate, with normal, on-speed indications both on the light system, and on the cockpit AOA gauge.  This became a real eye-opener for IPs and students alike!

The other thing I discovered was a developing resistance from ‘Command.’  We had the ride ‘in place’ when ATC Stan/Eval showed up for our Wing inspection that cycle, and actually received “kudos” for the initiative.  HQ ATC Stan/Eval was totally behind our effort in this endeavor.  However, others in the Command were not convinced.  Yet they still could not counter the argument: if our T-38 stall/sink rate recognition training was adequate, why were we still losing folks?  And that’s what actually sold it.

Once I became convinced that we could teach T-38 stall and sink-rate recognition and recovery procedures better than we were, I began to dig deeper into things – and I made some interesting discoveries.  I was able to access the ATC archives and found the first edition of ATCM 51-38, the manual used to teach flying the T-38.  Out of curiosity, before I went any further, I also looked at a T-33 flight manual.  The T-33 was the jet used before the T-38 became operational.  It was a ‘straight-wing’ aircraft while the ’38 is a ‘swept-wing’ aircraft.

In reviewing the two flight manuals I was astounded to find that the paragraphs on “stall recovery” for both aircraft were virtually the same!  It appeared that someone had just taken the paragraph on T-33 stall characteristics and recovery techniques, and transferred it to ATCM 51-38.  They failed to fully realize that the stall characteristics and behaviors of the T-33 (straight wing) and the T-38 (swept wing) are remarkably different.  In addition, the T-38 is prone to very high sink rates with low thrust settings, e.g. with the throttles retarded.  It was at this point then that I began to shift my attention more on T-38 high sink rates than on their actual stall characteristics.

After extracting the 39 stall/sink rate-related accidents from the ATC Flight Safety database, I created a simple matrix that included the phase of flight (straight-in approach, final turn, short final), aircraft configuration (gear up or down, flap setting), pattern spacing (e.g. too ‘tight’ to the runway or too wide from the runway), solo or dual, and so forth.  When it was complete it was very revealing.  In all cases, the position of the throttles was the common denominator.  In each accident, they were found to be at or near the Idle position just before the onset of either the stall and/or a high sink rate.

While the T-38 stall characteristics tend to be very obvious, the onset of a high sink rate is very insidious.  Yes, these accidents were categorized as ‘stall’ related, but the real problem was the induced high sink rate.  Now I had a problem.  It wasn’t T-38 ” “stalls” per se that were leading to these mishaps, it was their high sink rates!

Now that I had a deeper understanding of the problem at hand, I began to work on the solution.  As the Chief of the Wing Stan Eval Division at the time, I could get a jet just about any time I wanted or needed to.  This greatly facilitated my project here.  I then sought out the most experienced IPs (Instructor Pilots) we had on base at the time and with their inputs, the T-38 Stall/Sink Rate Ride began to take shape.  Now it was time to take to the air.

We typically performed our stall maneuvers from 13,000 to 19,000 feet, with the Throttles set to 85%.  We would typically begin with a simulated “Normal Final Turn” stall with the flaps at either Full or 60%.  Once configured, we would roll into a Final Turn attitude and begin increasing back stick pressure.  It wouldn’t take long before the aircraft would begin transitioning through its characteristic stall buffets (light, moderate, heavy) before developing into a fully developed stall.  At that point, the sink rate would become “obvious.”

Then we took the exercise a step further; we reduced the throttles even more.  In doing this we could show how we could induce a high sink rate without transitioning through the typical T-38 stall buffets!  As a matter of fact, I could put the aircraft into a very high sink rate, and point out that the AOA (angle of attack) indicators (the windscreen colored “arrow” indicator, and the cockpit gauge indicator), were reflecting “Normal!”  All the while the aircraft was sinking like a rock!

After I had the ride where I wanted it, I had to sell it.  ATC in those days tended to be very ‘parochial’ in its thinking.  I knew when I went to Command to present my idea, I would have to be very sensitive as to how I presented the idea.  I was not only suggesting a new way to approach T-38 Stall/Sink Rate training, but I was also suggesting the ride be “ungraded!”  This was not without precedence.  The T-37  Spin Ride in T-37 Pilot Instructor Training was ungraded.

So I opened the proposal with a simple question: if our T-38 training of stalls and sink rate recognition and recovery is “adequate,” then why are we continuing to lose folks after 25 years of operational experience?  As late as early 1986 two pilots were killed at Sheppard AFB, TX in a Final Turn sink rate mishap.

In the spring of 1985 I was the 12th Flying Training Wing (FTW) Chief of Stan Eval at Randolph Field, TX when HQ/ATC (Air Training Command) convened a ‘risk-assessment’ conference on all aspects of our flying operations.  It probably wasn’t a bad idea – to take a ‘time out,’ and have a look at how we were doing business.

As the conference began, one of the “high-risk” maneuvers identified was the ‘T-38 Final Turn.’  This is a phase of flight wherein we make a descending 180-degree turn to the runway in preparation for landing.  During the turn, we typically lose 1200 feet, and reduce our airspeed by 20 knots or so.  This maneuver is tough enough in and of itself in calm winds, but when the dynamics of crosswinds, headwinds, and tailwinds (or combinations thereof) are introduced, it becomes very challenging.  Many students have been ‘washed out’ of UPT (Undergraduate Pilot Training) at this point; a few have been killed.

Mostly, I sat and listened as the issue was discussed.  Yep, everyone agreed; the T-38 Final Turn was a “high-risk” maneuver, and increased emphasis should be rendered on it.  At that time, this usually meant, ‘brief’ everyone, have them sign off on an FCIF (Flight Crew Information File), and create a new 35mm Learning Center slide show on the hazards involved.  I just sat there, shaking my head.  Briefings, FCIFs, and Leaning Center programs – ATC’s solutions to everything in those days.  I wondered to myself: why not take the kid out to the area in the jet, and show him the hazards of stalls and sink rates?

I was still shaking my head in dismay as I left that afternoon.  Briefings, FCIFs, and Learning Center programs – all created by ‘rising stars’ at Command at the time!  Well, in my experience, great briefings never taught anyone how to fly!  I never once asked an IP to ‘brief me harder’ because I wasn’t “getting it.”  I often would ask him ‘to show me’ – in the jet.  Why not use the jet to teach?

My concept was not without precedence.  In the T-37 program, there was a ride solely devoted to teaching the T-37 spin characteristics – because so many pilots had been lost in T-37 spins, a few of them in the final turn.  It was a non-graded ride given to each student in the T-37 Pilot Instructor Pilot (PIT) program.  Well, the answer to me was obvious:  why not create such a ride in the T-38 PIT program, solely dedicated to examining the T-38 stall and sink rate characteristics?

I soon got home and began brainstorming.  It was exciting – an opportunity to create something besides another mundane briefing and  Learning Center program!

I had a prior assignment to HQ/ATC Flight Safety, so I knew how to get access to the actual T-38 Final Turn accident statistics without too much trouble at all.  That was my first stop early the next morning before the conference kicked off again at 0900.  I turned their statistician loose and by lunch, he had some interesting figures for me.  From the time we began teaching in the T-38 in the early ’60s through 1985, we had lost 39 airframes and killed 43 people!

Now I was even more emboldened!  If our T-38 stall training was ‘adequate,’ why were we still killing so many folks in stall/sink rate-related accidents?  And, losing airframes?  Unfortunately, our latest loss had been just a few months before.  Were our briefings incomplete?  Were our Learning Center presentations inadequate?  Or, were we just not teaching T-38 stalls and sink-rate recognition adequately enough?